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REVIEWS
THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM1. By Fritz Machlup. Philadelphia: The
Blakiston Company, 1949. Pp. vii, 275. $5.00.
OF the many paradoxes posed by the attempt to enforce competition,
none is more exasperating than the riddle of basing-point pricing. Here is
a system which is capable of precise exposition and graphic delineation, as
has been ably demonstrated by Professor Machlup in his timely monograph.
Yet the effects are controversial, and the remedies baffling. It is like a
game of checkers in its geometric nicety; but the onlookers, and perhaps
the players, are blindfolded.
Readers of the YALE LAW JOUpNAL are presumably acquainted with the
economic arguments for and against geographic price systems, lucidly set
down in a recent Comment,' and with the political implications, etched by
Professor Latham.2 Such readers may well inquire why we must have a
whole book on basing-points at this time, especially one which, in the
author's own apt characterization, "is rich in economic theory and poor in
statistical material." 3
The first and not the slightest reason is that Professor Machlup just hap-
pened to have it in his pocket at this critical moment. Designed as part of
a larger work on The Economics of Price Discrimination, the basing-point
chapters were amputated as a sacrifice, and a worthy one, to the current fray.
The second excuse for his using so many words is the opportunity that
space gives for clarification by patient definition and analysis. Thus, the
ghostly twins, phantom freight and freight absorption, are given substance
by working through every example to the real twins, net price to the seller
and delivered price to the buyer. It is frequently asserted, for example,
that injury to buyers near a non-base mill results from the "phantom
freight" added to the base price of a more distant base mill. Machlup dem-
onstrates what seems absurdly simple once it has been explained, that the
same consequences can be obtained by manipulating base prices. Take a
hypothetical situation based on the Corn Products case. This example is
intended to focus on the plight of candy manufacturers buying glucose in
the Kansas City area, where the defendant's mill constructed its prices
on a Chicago base. Suppose the Chicago price is 850, and freight is $10 to
Kansas City. The delivered price in Kansas City is then 860, and 60 is the
mill net for the Kansas City seller. This sum is commonly said to include
1. Price Systems and Compeition: The Basing-Point Issues, S3 I. L J. 426
(1949).
2. Giantism and Basing-Points: A Political Analysis, 58 YA= L J. 33 (1949).
3. P.v. The illustrations are drawm, Nith regrets for their incompleteness, from
steel, cement, and corn products. Professor Fetter's THE MAsQUF'MAD oF MOIODDLY
(1931) was, with a larger theme, more pungent and varied in its materials, and also
more argumentative and impassioned.
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$10 phantom freight, and everyone from the Supreme Court to Senator
Capehart is outraged. Very well; Kansas City is made a base, and the base
price is set at $60. The phantom freight evaporates. Similarly, on a sale
$4 (freightwise) toward Chicago, Kansas City, which formerly collected
S2 in phantom freight from the delivered price of $56, now is said to absorb
84 freight in meeting the same delivered price, which is still controlled by
the lower Chicago base. To those who believe in freight absorption as a
magic sponge which soaks up all stains of collusion, this is practically an act
of charity.
But I would not like to have to explain the difference between the old
and new pricing to a disgruntled candy manufacturer. Only lawyers and
economists who have been long schooled in the craft of meeting competition
where no competition exists can appreciate such a sleight-of-hand.
The example given is perhaps an uncommon one (though it demolishes
the notion that freight absorption is good and phantom freight bad); and it
would not do to infer from it that the whole basing point problem is a phan-
tom. Professor Machlup slogs through monopoly theory to establish that,
while perfected basing-point systems are an outgrowth of essentially anti-
competitive industries, they are also powerful devices to keep competition
from breaking out. He then weaves through the maze of discrimination
inherent in the systems, and again demonstrates that even the beneficiaries
of discrimination are in fact the victims of a wasteful process which makes
prices to all higher than they might otherwise be.
Such findings should now be familiar, and my busy reader may still ask
why they need most of a book to develop, even with refinements and qual-
ifications. In defense I would now point to the great unsettlement that
still prevails among economists over the alternatives to basing-points.
Their leading trade journal, the American Economic Review, has recently
published three articles by distinguished authorities; 4 they are not wholly
in accord. Professor Frank A. Fetter, who has since died at the pinnacle
of triumph after a thirty years' war against basing-points, nails up twenty-
two theses in favor of his old love, compulsory f.o.b. mill pricing. Dr. Corwin
Edwards of the FTC hints as broadly as he can that the industrialists who
have unwillingly cast off their chains should use their freedom in sporadic
chiselling, the nearest an oligopoly is likely to come to meaningful price
competition. Professor J. M. Clark, first to expound the uses of unsystematic
discrimination, 5 is now more cautious. He perceives the need for an area
of uncertainty in the pricing of such products as steel and cement, but he
raises the spectre of cutthroat competition, and is affrighted by it,
Professor Machlup explores all these contentions. Unimpressed by the
4. Fetter, Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38 Am. Eco N. REV. 815 (1948); Edwards,
Basing Point Decisions and Business Practices, 38 Am, EcoN. R-v. 828 (1948); Clark,
The Law and Economics of Basing Points, 39 Am. EcoN. REV. 430 (1949).
5. In his EcONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COST 416-33 (1923),
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likelihood that an industry with powerful leaders will destroy itself, he is
receptive to any plan that will diminish the waste and rigidity of systematic
interpenetration of markets. But he makes a telling objection to the as-
sumption that a healthy anarchy will follow the dethroning of basing points.
"It would be possible for an industry to give up the basing-point
system and adopt price-making policies that do not constitute a col-
lective system, but rather consist of individual and independent
ways of going after the desired business without regard to price
maintenance. But is it likely that sellers who for many years have
respected their own price lists as well as those of their competitors
will suddenly forget all they have learned and will start doing
what they have come to regard as unethical? If I am correct in
assuming that this is very unlikely, then at least a period of psy-
chological reconditioning is necessary before an industry can ac-
quire the proper 'propensity to compete.' This is particularly nec-
essary in industries dominated by large firms, where the small firms
have become conditioned to follow the leaders, and the leaders can
use discriminatory methods of imposing their will upon unwilling
followers. It is doubtful, to say the least, that collusive price mak-
ing can be eliminated in such an industry as long as its dominant
members can practice price discrimination." 0
He is thus driven to the conclusion that, in industries with a high con-
centration of control, uniform f.o.b. mill pricing is the only practical alter-
native to formal regulation. To be sure, the Federal Trade Commission
disavows having the power to order f.o.b. pricing, and its interpretations
of the Cement case boil down to the formula, "Do what you like, as long as
it is not collusive." Machlup thinks this can be read, "Do what you like,
as long as it is f.o.b. mill pricing." 7 I hasten to add that he is not uncritical
of f.o.b. In it he properly finds weaknesses that reflect the brute fact of dom-
ination by large firms in the industries concerned.
The final reason why Professor Machlup had to write a book was to dispel
some of the vast nonsense that has accumulated since the Cement case.
Witness the notion that the shift to f.o.b. in steel and cement required an
increase in mill net prices. Witness the skillful appeal of the smaller com-
panies in the corn products industry to the Federal Trade Commission to
save them from the perils of competition. Witness the tendentious hearings
of the Capehart Committee. And what is one to say of the gyrations of
Commissioner Lowell Mason, the Don Quixote of the Trade Commission?
Lawyers may take some comfort from the apparent fact that the law of
geographic pricing systems is, at the moment, more settled than their
economics. Professor Machlup, as well as some of his economist colleagues
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cases, and to draw distinctions that would do credit to a budding Black-
stone. To be sure, the proponents of competitive discrimination have a
considerable chore to distinguish away the ominous perils of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Spokesmen for the Federal Trade Commission may suggest
that it can draw a line between good and bad discrimination; but that is not
likely to be entirely satisfying to the businessman whose counsellors are
startling him with interpretations of Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission."
Professor Machlup, I should 'note in conclusion, wears his economic
theory easily; and his book is remarkably intelligible to anyone interested
in following him across the checkerboard. Will it be convincing? That
depends, I suspect, on the extent to which one shares the author's "old-
fashioned . . . belief that a truly competitive order is not only the best
guarantee for the preservation of freedom but also the best mechanism for
the allocation of economic resources." 9
RALPH S. BROWN, JR.t
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO To HEGEL. By Huntington Cairns. Balti-
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xv, 583.
THIs book, the third in a series which is to be completed by a fourth on
the Elements of Legal Theory, is designed by Dr. Cairns to treat the law
from the point of view of philosophy in the same way that the preceding vol-
umes have adopted the standpoint of the social sciences, of logic, and of the
empirical sciences respectively. There are chapters on Plato, Aristotle, Cic-
ero, Aquinas, Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Iant, Fichte
and Hegel. As far as possible Dr. Cairns has allowed each to speak in his
own words, without attempting the hopeless task of reconciling differences
or of proving the superiority of one over another. The result is a number of
pleasantly discursive accounts of what these thinkers have to say about the
nature of law, its relation to the state and society, and the problems of legal
interpretation, with a few final paragraphs to each chapter summing up the
results.
Although Plato is linked up with Bentham, Bacon with Dewey, and Leibniz
with Russell, the book is mainly concerned with philosophies about the law
rather than philosophies immanent in or arising out of legal systems. Readers
who already have some acquaintance with the work of any one philosopher
may not learn much from the pages given to him; but the student of Juris-
prudence seeking an introduction to this or that thinker will find this book
as useful as most. Dr. Cairns has no illusions about the imperfections of a
8. 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
9. P. 50.
' Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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